Architecture Design

Chapter 4 — Core Switch Security Hardening Design Guide


Architecture design for core switch security hardening begins with a clear understanding of the network topology, security zone boundaries, and the trust relationships between zones. A well-designed architecture makes hardening controls easier to implement, verify, and maintain. Conversely, a poorly designed architecture creates ambiguity about where controls should be applied and makes it difficult to enforce consistent policies across the environment.

The reference architecture presented in this chapter is based on a dual-core switch design with MLAG redundancy, which is the most common deployment model for enterprise and data center environments. The architecture is organized into five distinct security zones, each with defined trust boundaries, access controls, and monitoring requirements. The design principles and zone model are applicable to other topologies (spine-leaf, collapsed core, chassis-based) with appropriate adaptations.

4.1 Typical System Topology

The reference topology illustrates the complete security architecture for a dual-core switch deployment. The topology is organized vertically by security zone, with the most trusted zones at the bottom (OOB management) and the least trusted at the top (Internet/WAN). All inter-zone traffic flows through defined enforcement points, and no zone can directly access another without traversing the appropriate security control.

Core Switch Security Hardening Topology — Dual-Core with MLAG, OOB Management, and Five Security Zones
Figure 4.1: Core Switch Security Hardening Topology — Dual-Core Switches (Core-SW-A/B) with MLAG Peer-Link, NGFW Pair, Distribution Layer, and Isolated OOB Management Network

The topology demonstrates several critical design decisions. First, the OOB management network is completely separate from the production network, with its own switch, IP addressing, and access controls. Second, the core switches connect to the firewall pair via dedicated uplink ports that are assigned to the uplink VRF/VLAN, ensuring that management traffic never traverses production interfaces. Third, the MLAG peer-link uses dedicated ports with a separate VLAN to prevent production traffic from traversing the peer-link. Fourth, all management infrastructure (jump host, AAA, Syslog, NTP, config backup) is reachable only through the OOB management network.

Zone Definitions and Trust Boundaries

ZoneComponentsTrust LevelAccess ControlMonitoring
Internet/WAN ZoneBorder routers, ISP links, WAN circuitsUntrustedFirewall policy; BGP prefix filtering; GTSMBGP session state; prefix count; anomaly detection
DMZ ZoneNGFW pair, DMZ servers, load balancersSemi-trustedFirewall rules; ACL on core switch uplinksFirewall logs; IDS/IPS alerts; flow analysis
Production ZoneCore switches (production VRF), distribution, access, serversTrustedVLAN segmentation; ACL; DAI; DHCP snoopingPerformance metrics; CoPP counters; routing table
OOB Management ZoneOOB switch, console server, jump host, AAA, Syslog, NTP, backupHighly trustedPhysical isolation; management firewall; source IP allowlistAll management access logged; AAA accounting; config change alerts
MLAG Peer ZonePeer-link interfaces, MLAG keepaliveTrusted (internal)Dedicated VLAN; no production traffic; peer authenticationPeer-link utilization; MLAG state; keepalive status

4.2 Device Connection Diagram

The device connection diagram provides a rack-level view of the physical cabling and port assignments for the dual-core switch deployment. This diagram is essential for installation teams, as it specifies exactly which ports connect to which devices, what cable types are used, and how the OOB management network is physically connected. Color-coded cables distinguish between production, management, peer-link, and uplink connections.

Core Switch Security Hardening Device Connection Diagram — Rack-Level Port and Cable Assignment
Figure 4.2: Device Connection Diagram — Core Switch A and B Rack Layout with Color-Coded Cable Assignments (Orange=Uplink, Blue=Production, Red=MLAG Peer-Link, Green=OOB Management) and OOB Management Rack

The connection diagram enforces several security design principles at the physical layer. Dedicated management ports (typically 1G RJ45) connect exclusively to the OOB management switch, never to production patch panels. Console ports connect to the console server via RS-232 cables, providing emergency access independent of all network connectivity. The MLAG peer-link uses dedicated high-speed ports (100G DAC cables) with no production VLANs allowed on the peer-link interfaces. Dual PDUs from separate power feeds provide power redundancy without creating single points of failure.

Cable and Port Assignment Summary

Connection TypeCable ColorCable TypePort AssignmentSecurity Notes
Uplink to FirewallOrange100G QSFP28 SR4 or LR4Dedicated uplink ports (e.g., Eth1/1/1–1/1/4)Assigned to uplink VRF; no management traffic
MLAG Peer-LinkRed100G DAC or AOCDedicated peer-link ports (e.g., Eth1/2/1–1/2/2)Dedicated VLAN; no production VLANs; peer authentication
Downlink to DistributionBlue100G QSFP28 SR4 or DACProduction downlink ports (e.g., Eth2/1/1–2/1/24)Production VRF; CoPP applied; routing auth enabled
OOB ManagementGreen1G Cat6 RJ45Management port (e.g., Mgmt0/1)Management VRF only; source IP allowlist; no routing to production
ConsoleGrayRS-232 RJ45 rolloverConsole port (RJ45)Connected to console server; emergency access only; session logging
PowerBlackC13/C19 power cordPSU-A to PDU-A; PSU-B to PDU-BSeparate PDUs from separate power feeds; no single point of failure

4.3 Security Zone Enforcement Points

Each security zone boundary has defined enforcement points where access controls are applied. The following table maps each zone boundary to the specific controls that must be implemented and verified. These enforcement points form the backbone of the hardening architecture and must be validated during acceptance testing.

Zone BoundaryEnforcement PointControls AppliedAcceptance Test
Internet → DMZBorder router + NGFWBGP prefix filtering, GTSM, NGFW policyUnauthorized prefix rejected; NGFW policy verified
DMZ → Production CoreCore switch uplink ACLInbound ACL on uplink ports; CoPP for control planeACL blocks unauthorized traffic; CoPP counters stable under load
Production → ManagementManagement VRF isolationNo route between production and management VRFsPing from production host to management IP fails; SSH from production fails
Management → Core SwitchManagement firewall + source ACLSource IP allowlist; SSH/HTTPS only; AAA authenticationOnly jump host IPs can SSH; unauthorized source rejected
Core → DistributionDownlink port securityRouting auth; DAI; DHCP snooping; STP guardsRogue routing peer rejected; ARP spoofing blocked; rogue DHCP blocked
MLAG Peer ZonePeer-link VLAN isolationDedicated peer-link VLAN; no production VLANs; peer authenticationProduction traffic does not traverse peer-link; peer-link VLAN isolated

4.4 High-Availability Architecture Considerations

High-availability architecture introduces specific security considerations that must be addressed during design. The most critical concern is ensuring that security policies remain consistent and effective during and after a failover event. MLAG and stacking designs synchronize forwarding state between peers, but security policy synchronization varies by platform and must be explicitly verified.

HA Security Design Principle: Every security control that is applied to the active node must be equally applied to the standby/peer node. Never assume that HA synchronization includes security policy synchronization—verify explicitly for each control on each platform.
HA ModelSecurity Sync BehaviorManual Sync RequiredFailover Test Requirement
MLAG (Multi-Chassis LAG)Forwarding state synced; ACL/CoPP typically NOT synced automaticallyYes — ACL, CoPP, AAA, Syslog, NTP must be manually syncedVerify all controls active on both peers; planned failover test required
VSS/VSF StackSingle logical switch; config applied once; synced automaticallyNo — but verify sync status after config changesPlanned failover test to verify management access continuity
Chassis Dual SupervisorActive/standby supervisor; config synced; verify security-specific featuresPartial — verify CoPP and ACL sync on specific platformsSupervisor switchover test with management access verification
Active/Active RoutingIndependent routing processes; each node must have identical configYes — full config sync required; use automation for consistencyPer-node acceptance test; failover test for each routing protocol