Security & Risks

Chapter 6 — Core Switch Security Hardening Design Guide


Understanding the threat landscape for core switches is a prerequisite for effective hardening. Core switches are high-value targets because they sit at the center of the network and have visibility into all traffic flows. A successful attack on a core switch can result in complete network disruption, data exfiltration, lateral movement to any connected segment, or persistent access through configuration backdoors. The threat model must account for both external attackers who have gained a foothold in the network and insider threats with legitimate access.

This chapter presents the primary threat categories, specific attack vectors, risk ratings, and the hardening controls that mitigate each risk. The risk ratings are based on a combination of likelihood and impact, using a standard 5×5 risk matrix. Controls are mapped to the eight hardening domains defined in Chapter 2, providing a clear link between threats and the specific actions required to address them.

6.1 Threat Categories and Attack Vectors

Threat CategoryAttack VectorTargetLikelihoodImpactRisk Rating
Management Plane AttacksBrute-force SSH/Telnet; credential stuffing; session hijackingManagement access; configurationHighCriticalCritical
Control Plane FloodingBGP/OSPF packet flood; ICMP flood; ARP storm targeting CPURouting stability; availabilityMediumCriticalHigh
Routing Protocol AttacksBGP route injection; OSPF neighbor spoofing; route hijackingTraffic forwarding; routing tableMediumCriticalHigh
L2 AttacksARP spoofing; DHCP starvation; STP topology manipulation; MAC floodingL2 forwarding; VLAN integrityHighHighHigh
Configuration TamperingUnauthorized config change; backdoor account creation; ACL modificationSecurity policy; access controlMediumCriticalHigh
Physical Access AttacksConsole port access; USB boot; port insertion; hardware tamperingFull device controlLowCriticalMedium
Supply Chain AttacksCompromised firmware/software; counterfeit hardware; malicious transceiverDevice integrity; data confidentialityLowCriticalMedium
Insider ThreatsPrivileged user abuse; credential sharing; unauthorized config changesConfiguration; data; availabilityMediumHighHigh
Denial of ServiceTraffic flooding; control plane exhaustion; resource exhaustion attacksAvailability; forwarding performanceHighHighHigh
Credential CompromisePassword spray; phishing targeting network admins; TACACS+ server compromiseManagement access; AAA infrastructureMediumCriticalHigh

6.2 Management Plane Threat Analysis

The management plane is the highest-value target for attackers because control of the management plane means control of the entire device. Management plane attacks can be divided into two categories: authentication attacks that attempt to gain unauthorized access, and post-authentication attacks that abuse legitimate access to make unauthorized changes. Both categories require distinct countermeasures.

Attack TypeDescriptionPrimary ControlDetection Method
SSH Brute ForceRepeated login attempts against SSH serviceLogin rate limiting; source IP allowlist; key-only authFailed login threshold alert; AAA accounting
Telnet / HTTP InterceptionCleartext protocol credential captureDisable Telnet and HTTP; enforce SSH/HTTPS onlyProtocol usage monitoring; port scan detection
Session HijackingTCP session hijacking of active management sessionSSHv2 with session encryption; session timeout; MFAAnomalous session behavior; concurrent session alert
Unauthorized Config ChangeLegitimate credentials used to make unauthorized changesTACACS+ command authorization; change management; 4-eyesConfig change alert to SIEM; diff-based change detection
Backdoor Account CreationAttacker creates hidden local account for persistent accessProhibit local accounts (except emergency); AAA-only authLocal account audit; periodic config review
SNMP Community String ExploitationDefault or weak SNMP community strings used for config read/writeDisable SNMPv1/v2c; SNMPv3 AuthPriv only; source IP filterSNMP access logging; community string audit

6.3 Control Plane Threat Analysis

Control plane attacks target the routing and switching protocols that determine how traffic is forwarded through the network. These attacks can range from simple flooding attacks that exhaust CPU resources to sophisticated route injection attacks that redirect traffic through attacker-controlled paths. Control Plane Policing (CoPP) is the primary defense mechanism, but routing protocol authentication and prefix filtering are equally important for preventing protocol-level attacks.

Attack TypeProtocol AffectedAttack MechanismPrimary ControlDetection
BGP Route InjectionBGPAttacker establishes BGP session and injects false routesBGP MD5/SHA auth; prefix filtering; RPKI ROVBGP prefix count anomaly; RPKI invalid alerts
OSPF Neighbor SpoofingOSPFRogue router forms OSPF adjacency and injects LSAsOSPF MD5/SHA auth; passive interfaces; GTSMUnexpected OSPF neighbor alert; LSA anomaly
CPU Exhaustion via FloodingAll protocolsHigh-rate control packets sent to CPUCoPP with per-class rate limits; hardware-enforcedCoPP drop counters; CPU utilization alert
BFD Session DisruptionBFDSpoofed BFD packets cause false failure detectionBFD authentication; GTSM on BFD sessionsBFD session flap alert; routing convergence event
STP Topology ManipulationSTP/RSTPRogue switch sends superior BPDUs to become rootBPDU Guard; Root Guard; BPDU authenticationRoot bridge change alert; topology change notification
ICMP Redirect AttackICMPICMP redirects used to redirect traffic through attackerDisable ICMP redirects on all interfacesICMP redirect packet detection; routing anomaly

6.4 Risk Mitigation Priority Matrix

The risk mitigation priority matrix maps each identified risk to the hardening domain responsible for its mitigation, the implementation effort required, and the residual risk after controls are applied. This matrix is intended to guide the prioritization of hardening activities when resources are constrained.

RiskHardening DomainEffortResidual RiskPriority
Unauthorized management accessManagement Plane HardeningLowLowP1 — Immediate
Control plane CPU exhaustionControl Plane Protection (CoPP)MediumLowP1 — Immediate
BGP route injectionRouting Protocol SecurityLowLowP1 — Immediate
ARP spoofing / DHCP starvationData Plane / L2 HardeningLowLowP2 — Short-term
Unauthorized config changesConfiguration Lifecycle SecurityMediumLowP2 — Short-term
Undetected security eventsMonitoring & LoggingMediumMediumP2 — Short-term
Physical access exploitationPhysical SecurityLowLowP3 — Medium-term
Supply chain compromiseSoftware & Supply Chain SecurityHighMediumP3 — Medium-term
HA failover security gapHigh Availability SecurityMediumLowP3 — Medium-term